The United States and its allies have been fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for a decade in a war that either side could still win. While a gradual drawdown has begun, significant numbers of US combat troops will remain in Afghanistan until at least 2014, perhaps longer, depending on the situation on the ground and the outcome of the US presidential election in 2012. Given the realities of the Taliban's persistence and the desire of US policymakers - and the public - to find a way out, what can and should be the goals of the US and its allies in Afghanistan? "Afghan Endgames" brings together some of the finest minds in the fields of history, strategy, anthropology, ethics, and mass communications to provide a clear, balanced, and comprehensive assessment of the alternatives for restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Presenting a range of options - from immediate withdrawal of all coalition forces to the maintenance of an open-ended, but greatly reduced military presence - the contributors weigh the many costs, risks, and benefits of each alternative. This important book boldly pursues several strands of thought suggesting that a strong, legitimate central government is far from likely to emerge in Kabul; that fewer coalition forces, used in creative ways, may have better effects on the ground than a larger, more conventional presence; and that, even though Pakistan should not be pushed too hard, so as to avoid sparking social chaos there, Afghanistan's other neighbors can and should be encouraged to become more actively involved. The volume's editors conclude that while there may never be complete peace in Afghanistan, a self-sustaining security system able to restore order swiftly in the wake of violence is attainable.

This volume develops information strategy as a construct equal in importance to military strategy as an influential tool of statecraft.

John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer explore three principal themes:

• the rise of the a ~information domaina (TM) and information strategy as an equal partner alongside traditional military strategy
• the need to consider the organizational implications of information strategy
• the realm of what has been called a ~information operationsa (TM) (IO) - the building blocks of information strategy - has been too narrowly depicted and must be both broadened and deepened.

Information Strategy and Warfare will be essential reading for students and practitioners of information strategy, as well as scholars of security studies and military strategy in general.

First Published in 1992. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor and Francis, an informa company.

Although there is already a wealth of literature that examines the causes and impacts of war on the international system, there has been little analysis of the decisions of leaders who initiate wars they are destined to lose.

This volume develops information strategy as a construct equal in importance to military strategy as an influential tool of statecraft.

John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer explore three principal themes:

• 
  

  
  

• the rise of the 'information domain' and information strategy as an equal partner alongside traditional military strategy
• 
  

  
  

  
  

• the need to consider the organizational implications of information strategy
• 
  

  
  

  
  

• the realm of what has been called 'information operations' (IO) - the building blocks of information strategy - has been too narrowly depicted and must be both broadened and deepened.
• 
  

Information Strategy and Warfare will be essential reading for students and practitioners of information strategy, as well as scholars of security studies and military strategy in general.

This book includes essays about conflict in the information age that show how the information revolution is altering the nature of conflict.

The conflict in Iraq is characterized by three faces of war: interstate conflict, civil war, and insurgency. The Coalition’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 began as an interstate war. No sooner had Saddam Hussein been successfully deposed, however, than U.S.-led forces faced a lethal insurgency. After Sunni al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Shia al-Askari Shrine in 2006, the burgeoning conflict took on the additional element of civil war with sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia. The most effective strategies in a war as complicated as the three-level conflict in Iraq are intertwined and complementary, according to the editors of this volume. For example, the “surge” in U.S. troops in 2007 went beyond an increase in manpower; the mission had changed, giving priority to public security. This new direction also simultaneously addressed the insurgency as well as the civil war by forging new, trusting relationships between Americans and Iraqis and between Sunni and Shia. This book has broad implications for future decisions about war and peace in the twenty-first century.

Contrary to widely held views of Ronald Reagan as a reflexive man of action, John Arquilla's sharply revisionist study argues that he was drawn to and driven by ideas. In Mr. Arquilla's view, Reagan during his presidency articulated important new concepts that fundamentally reshaped American foreign policy. He saw the effort simply to contain Soviet expansion as too defensive in nature, so he replaced it with a doctrine designed to help others free themselves from totalitarian rule. He objected to the notion of mutual nuclear deterrence on practical and ethical grounds, a stand that led him to negotiate arms reductions as well as explore the possibility of missile defense. On these issues, as Mr. Arquilla shows, Reagan overturned a long-standing consensus of public and expert opinion, helping achieve a favorable end to the cold war and the arms race that came with it. Yet there were also areas in which Reagan's policies played out less successfully-his inattention to the consequences of nuclear proliferation by smaller powers like Pakistan; his indecision in launching a preventive war against terrorism in the mid-1980s-with consequences that continue to haunt us today. In an incisive and balanced critique, Mr. Arquilla has set new standards of measurement for Reagan's foreign policy accomplishments and shortcomings. The Reagan Imprint is likely to be a source of lively debate within the establishment and outside it for years to come. With 15 explanatory graphs.

The conflict in Iraq is characterized by three faces of war: interstate conflict, civil war, and insurgency. The Coalition s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 began as an interstate war. No sooner had Saddam Hussein been successfully deposed, however, than U.S.-led forces faced a lethal insurgency. After Sunni al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Shia al-Askari Shrine in 2006, the burgeoning conflict took on the additional element of civil war with sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia.The most effective strategies in a war as complicated as the three-level conflict in Iraq are intertwined and complementary, according to the editors of this volume. For example, the surge in U.S. troops in 2007 went beyond an increase in manpower; the mission had changed, giving priority to public security. This new direction also simultaneously addressed the insurgency as well as the civil war by forging new, trusting relationships between Americans and Iraqis and between Sunni and Shia. This book has broad implications for future decisions about war and peace in the twenty-first century.

The factors leading to the defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II have been debated for decades. One prevalent view is that overwhelming Allied superiority in materials and manpower doomed the Axis. Another holds that key strategic and tactical blunders lost the war-from Hitler halting his panzers outside Dunkirk, allowing more than 300,000 trapped Allied soldiers to escape, to Admiral Yamamoto falling into the trap set by the U.S. Navy at Midway. Providing a fresh perspective on the war, this study challenges both views and offers an alternative explanation: the Germans, Japanese and Italians made poor design choices in ships, planes, tanks and information security-before and during the war-that forced them to fight with weapons and systems that were too soon outmatched by the Allies. The unprecedented arms race of World War II posed a fundamental "design challenge" the Axis powers sometimes met but never mastered.

Special operations, though most commonly associated with the period from the Second World War to the present, have played a key role throughout the history of conflict from the Trojan War to the great arms struggles of the 20th century. This volume introduces the reader to the broad sweep of the history of special operations, and also includes several excerpts from the classic literature on the subject. Contents: Origins: Robert Graves, 'The Wooden Horse', 'The Sack of Troy'; Raiding in the Age of Sail: G.M. Thomson, 'The Damage Done by this Corsair', 'The Wind Commands Me Away'; Ian Grimble, 'The Imp,^Rrieuse'; The Early American Tradition: Kenneth Roberts, 'The Raid on St. Francis'; Fred Cook, 'Struggle for the South'; R.E. Dupuy and W.H. Baumer, 'Wars With the Barbary Pirates'; 19th Century Colonial Warfare; Leo Tolstoy, The Raid; Wyatt Blassingame, 'How the Legion Began', 'The Legion Fights in Algeria'; The Civil War: Archer Hines, 'Military Means, Political Ends'; Bruce Catton, 'Total War and an Election'; World War I: Lowell Thomas, 'Trapped by a G-Ship..'; T.E. Lawrence, 'The Raid Upon the Bridges'; World War II in Western Europe and North Africa: Cajus Bekker, 'The Coup de Main at Eben Emael', 'The Blood-Bath of Crete'; Paul Carell, 'A British Commando Attempt to Capture Rommel', 'The British Raid on Tobruk', 'Brandenburgers in Action Behind the Front'; John Lodwick, Raiders from the Sea, Chapters 16-18; The Pacific War: Walter Lord, 'A Very Private War';Ronald Spector, 'The Road to Myitkyina'; Milton E. Miles, 'Chinese Pirates and the SACO Dragon'; Algeria, Round II: Jean Lart,^Rguy, 'The Leap of Leucadia'; The Ultimate Rescue: Chaim Herzog, 'Entebbe'; Bibliography; Index.

A balanced analysis-neither an attack nor an apology-of Ronald Reagan's influence on world politics and the United States position in the international community as a result of ideas and policies pursued during his presidency.